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Sales and Elections as Methods for
Transferring Corporate Control
Ronald I. Gilson & Alan Schwartz*
Delaware case law has rendered the tender offer obsolete as a method
for purchasing a company whose directors oppose the acquisition. A
potential acquirer facing target opposition today must run an insurgent
director slate, in the expectation that its directors are more likely to sell.
The Delaware courts have not justified their preference for elections
over markets as the preferred vehicle for implementing changes in
control. Informal scholarly analyses ask transaction cost questions,
such as whether proxy contests are more costly than takeovers. This
article attempts to break new ground by asking whether there are
systematic differences in the performance of elections and markets in
the corporate context. Recent models of voting processes, we argue,
strongly suggest that elections are inferior to markets. Proxy contest
elections sometimes can be won by incumbent managements when a
transfer of control would be efficient, a conclusion consistent with the
sparse data; and the proxy election process aggregates information
regarding the sale decision less well than markets do, thereby implying
that proxy voters are less well-informed. Theory and data thus suggest,
at the least, that the intellectual burden of proof should change:
the task now is to justify using elections to transfer control despite
their apparent deficiencies. The article briefly considers the policy
implications of this change in perspective.
Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford University, and Stem Professor of
Law and Business, Columbia University; Sterling Professor of Law, Yale University.
This paper was improved by comments made at a meeting of the Yale Law School
Center for Corporate Law, a Corporate Governance Conference at Tel Aviv Law
School, and a law and economics workshop at the University of Pennsylvania Law
School. Jennifer Arlen, Robert Daines, Jeffrey Gordon, Zohar Goshen, and Henry
Hansmann also made helpful suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
Under standard accounts of corporate governance, capital markets play
a significant role in monitoring management performance and, where
appropriate, replacing management whose performance does not measure up.
While the concept of a market for corporate control was once controversial,
now even the American Law Institute acknowledges that "transactions in
control and tender offers are mechanisms through which market review of the
effectiveness of management's delegated discretion can operate.", Recent
case law in Delaware, however, appears to have altered dramatically the
mechanisms through which the market for corporate control must operate. In
particular, the interaction of the poison pill and the Delaware Supreme Court's
development of the legal standard governing defensive tactics in response to
tender offers has resulted in a decided, but as yet unexplained, preference for
control changes mediated by means of an election rather than by a market. In
this paper, we begin the evaluation of the preference for elections over markets
that the Delaware Supreme Court has not yet attempted.2 We apply to this effort
both doctrinal logic and insights derived from an interesting but complex
formal literature that has developed to understand how voting structures
work in political contests and jury deliberations. Since these contexts differ
substantially from transfers of corporate control, our analysis raises a question
of fit: Are voting models suitable for analyzing the question asked here? In
our view, the models do illuminate the takeover institution, but if this view is
i I American Law Inst., Principles of Corporate Governance, Analysis and
Recommendations 385 (1994).
2 The direct literature on this subject apparently consists of three papers: this one;
Lucian Bebchuk & Oliver Hart, Takeover Bids, Proxy Fights and Corporate Voting
(Mimeo, Harvard Law Sch., 1999); Bilge Yilmaz, Strategic Voting and Proxy
Contests (Mimeo, Rodney L. White Ctr. for Fin. Research, Wharton, 1999). We will
compare these two papers to this one in later notes. Mikami considers a case, in
a full information environment, in which two management teams compete for the
right to manage a project by winning a proxy contest among atomized shareholders.
He shows that the winning team will choose the project that the median shareholder
prefers, provided that the manager teams do not collude and are Willing to tolerate
considerable risk. Kazuhiko Mikami, Proxy Contests and Corporate Democracy,
40 J. Econ. Behav. & Org. 353 (1999). These conditions seem hard to satisfy in the
context of his model, and the model, because it does not contemplate purchase of
the company's outstanding stock by one of the proxy contestants, does not capture
closely the context that interests us.
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ultimately rejected, then we will have eliminated what at least superficially
appears to be a useful set of tools.
Part I provides a very brief account of the doctrinal development that has
given us the current bias towards elections, focusing primarily on the last
step in the process: the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Unitrin, Inc.
v. American General Corp.3 Part II then argues that economic efficiency,
as defined for this context below, is the appropriate normative criterion
for directing the choice between markets and elections as mechanisms for
effecting a change in control that is resisted by management. Parts III and
IV develop two models that show that elections can perform badly in proxy
contests in which the principal issue is whether the target company should be
sold or not. The first model assumes that shareholder voters are well informed
about the economic variables of interest, and the second supposes uncertainty
about these variables.
Market sales apparently lack the defects that these models show can affect
elections. Current regulation, which facilitates competing bids, and current
takeover technologies, which permit making them, would eliminate much
of the inefficiency in takeover bidding that prior models have identified
if bidders could make proposals directly to target shareholders. The target
would then be an auction seller. A standard result in auction theory is that
if the seller chooses a revenue-maximizing auction form, it is a dominant
strategy for bidders-here potential acquirers-to bid their true valuations.
The dominant strategy for a maximizing seller then is to accept the winning
bid. Therefore, target shareholders will not be in a strategic situation in an
auction world. As a consequence, we focus on the possible inefficiencies
arising from a judicial preference for elections (in which it is optimal for
shareholders to act strategically) over markets as a takeover mechanism.4
In Part V, we return to doctrine to show how the Unitrin rule's preference for
3 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
4 Takeover models in which target shareholders play strategically commonly have
only one acquirer and one set of (possibly large) shareholders. In these models,
takeovers always are efficient when shareholders play pure strategies (tender all their
shares or not); takeovers also are efficient when shareholders play mixed strategies
(hold-out a fraction of their shares with positive probability); but shareholders may
tender less frequently than they should when they play mixed strategies and the
number of shareholders is very large. See, e.g., Thomas H. Noe & Lynn Pi, Learning
Dynamics, Genetic Algorithms, and Corporate Takeovers, 24 J. Econ. Dynamics &
Control 189 (2000); Bengt Holmstrom & Barry Nalebuff, To the Raider Goes the
Surplus? A Reexamination of the Free Rider Problem, I J. Econ. & Mgmt. Strategy
37 (1992). Bebchuk & Hart, supra note 2, develop a model in this genre and suggest
policies to reduce inefficiencies in tendering. As said above, an auction environment
adds players on the buying side and thus ameliorates these inefficiencies. It is a
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elections over markets may be eliminated without requiring the Delaware
Supreme Court to confess error. We also suggest that for jurisdictions with
courts less influential than the Delaware courts, a statutory change to permit
more sales of control would be best.
I. PRIVILEGING ELECTIONS: UNITRIN'S PRECLUSION STANDARD
Fifteen years ago, the Delaware Supreme Court decided two landmark cases
that sought to provide a framework for the legal rules governing hostile
takeovers. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.5 announced a proportionality
standard of review for defensive tactics: a target board of directors must
demonstrate that a defensive response is reasonable in relation to the threat
posed by a hostile offer. Moran v. Household International, Inc.6 approved
the adoption of a poison pill in anticipation of a possible hostile offer and stated
that a target board decision not to redeem a pill in the face of an actual offer
would be treated as a defensive tactic reviewable under the Unocal standard.
There followed "a remarkable struggle between the Chancery Court and the
Supreme Court for Unocal's soul."7
Stated starkly, the question was whether the threat that shareholders would
accept a hostile offer at too low a price was so severe that a target board
of directors could decline to redeem the target's poison pill and thereby
prevent the shareholders from choosing whether to accept the offer. As the
issue came to be framed, could the target board of directors "Just say no"?
The Chancery Court decided in favor of the primacy of shareholder choice
in rather ringing language. Chancellor Allen stated:
To acknowledge that directors may employ the recent innovation
of "poison pills" to deprive shareholders of the ability effectively
to accept a noncoercive offer, after the board has had a reasonable
opportunity to explore or create alternatives or attempt to negotiate
separate question, not considered here, whether even an efficient auction process
would inefficiently dampen search for poorly performing targets.
5 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
6 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
7 Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and what we can do about it), Del.
J. Corp. L. (forthcoming 2001). This is, by now, a familiar story that we do not
propose to retell in any detail here. For an extended account of the evolution of
Delaware takeover doctrine, see, for example, Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S. Black,
The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 801-95 (2d ed. 1995), 72-97 (Supp.
1999).
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on the shareholders' behalf, would, it seems to me, be so inconsistent
with widely shared notions of appropriate corporate governance as
to threaten to diminish the legitimacy and authority of our corporate
law.8
The Delaware Supreme Court, however, resolved this struggle by fiat in
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.9 But while Time left us with
no doubt that it rejected the Interco analysis, I" it also offered no statement of
when a target board could simply decline to pull a pill.
Some clarity, if not justification, was offered in Unitrin. A summary is
sufficient for present purposes. Under Unitrin, a defensive tactic-including
declining to redeem a poison pill-survives review under Unocal if it is
neither preclusive nor coercive and falls within a "range of reasonableness.""
According to the Delaware Supreme Court, the critical issue is whether the
defensive tactic is preclusive. But the first question is preclusive of what?
An unredeemed poison pill will always preclude a tender offer. It will not,
however, preclude the bidder from initiating a proxy fight to replace the
target's directors with nominees who are more likely to conclude, after careful
and informed deliberation, that the offer is in the shareholders' best interests
and thereafter redeem the pill. Does the presence of a poison pill force a bidder
to have the success of its offer determined by an election rather than a tender
offer?
Without confronting the issue directly, the Delaware Supreme Court
appears to have assumed that the availability of a proxy fight renders the
8 City Capital Assoc. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988). The question of
whether Chancellor Allen subsequently limited Interco to circumstances where the
target company actively sought to provide shareholders an alternative transaction
favored by management is raised by his opinion in 7W Services, Inc. v. SWT
Acquisition Corp., 1989 Del. Ch. Lexis 19, Fed. Sec. L. Rep (CCH) 94,334.
9 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
10 Plaintiff's position [that the threat of an under priced but non-coercive offer
was not sufficient to block shareholders' from having the opportunity to decide
whether to accept it] represents a fundamental misconception of our standard of
review principally because it would involve the court in substituting its judgment
for what is a "better" deal for that of a corporation's board of directors. To the
extent that the Court of Chancery has recently done so in several of its opinions,
we hereby reject such approach as not in keeping with a proper Unocal analysis.
See, e.g., Interco, 551 A.2d 787, and its progeny.
Id. at 1154. It is unclear whether Time's misreading of Interco, which was about the
allocation of decision authority between the board and shareholders, not the board
and the court, was deliberate or merely confused.
11 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 (Del. 1995).
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poison pill non-preclusive, thereby shifting attention to the circumstances
under which the proxy fight could be conducted. The Court acknowledged
that, "Without the approval of target boards, the danger of activating a poison
pill renders it irrational for a bidder to pursue stock acquisitions above the
triggering level."'2 Thus, a poison pill is preclusive of a tender offer. But under
Unitrin, it appears that refusal to redeem the pill is not preclusive under
Unocal unless a proxy fight is also precluded. On remand, the Supreme Court
directed the Chancery Court to "determine whether Unitrin's Repurchase
Program would only inhibit American General's ability to wage a proxy
fight and institute a merger or whether it was, in fact, preclusive because
American General's success would either be mathematically impossible or
realistically unattainable."' 3
Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court in Unitrin at least identified the
circumstance in which Unocal allows a target to block a tender offer by
declining to redeem a poison pill: if victory in a proxy fight would be neither
"mathematically impossible" nor "realistically unattainable." Because the
poison pill now is ubiquitous--every public company either has a pill or
can adopt one on short notice if a hostile offer is made-the Court's analysis
reduces functionally to a preference that control changes be resolved through
an election rather than through a market: targets can block tender offers so
long as a stymied bidder can press its case through a proxy fight.
We will not pause here to criticize the Court's confused doctrinal
analysis, 4 but, rather, focus instead on the wisdom of the Court's conclusion.
Are proxy contests preferable to tender offers as a means of resolving a control
challenge? Before attempting to answer this question, however, two process-
oriented criticisms are appropriate concerning the absence of transparency in
the Unitrin opinion.
First, an outcome as significant as privileging elections over markets
should at least come with an explanation. Providing a reason for an outcome
at least imposes the discipline of logic on the range of alternatives available
to the court. Perhaps more important, an explanation provides in equal
measure not only a justification of the past but also guidance for the
future. Ambiguity in its opinions may provide a court flexibility, as some
12 Id at 1381.
13 Id. at 1388-89.
14 For example, even if the availability of a proxy contest was relevant to whether a
pill must be redeemed, prior doctrine suggested that a higher standard should be
applied to target efforts to defend against a proxy fight than that applied when the
defensive tactic has rendered victory in a proxy fight mathematically or realistically
unattainable. See Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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commentators have suggested in defense of past Delaware Supreme Court
opinions, but that flexibility comes at the expense of giving parties the
information they need to order their affairs without excessive uncertainty.
The second process-oriented criticism of the Unitrin court's privileging
of elections over markets is the impact of this preference on the integrity
of the election process itself. The predictable result of Unitrin has been
a quickly escalating level of director-implemented barriers to contested
elections. The portion of the Chancery Court's opinion in Mentor Graphics
Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems15 that concerned a defensively adopted
bylaw illustrates the problem. The bylaw provided that upon a shareholder
request for a special meeting, the board could delay holding the meeting
for 90 to 100 days after it determines the validity of the initial request. The
Vice-Chancellor concluded that, "[T]he 90 to 100 day interval chosen by
the Quickturn board, although it may arguably approach the outer limit of
reasonableness, struck a proper balance in this specific case." 6 It is not unfair
to the Vice-Chancellor to note that there is no real discussion of why a delay
of 90 to 100 days is necessary. And it is certainly to the Vice-Chancellor's
credit that he was well aware of the risk that without an animating principle
that might serve to cabin the opinion's predictable expansive drift, approving
a 90- to 100-day delay would encourage ever more extreme measures. After
all, the worst that could happen to a target company is that it would lose.
The Vice-Chancellor therefore explicitly warned that, "[A]ttorneys who
represent corporate boards would best serve their clients well by counseling
caution and restraint in this area, rather than seeking continually to push
the time-delay envelope outwards to test its fiduciary duty limits."1 7 But the
laudable impulse to lecture counsel on their duties cannot substitute for the
lack of a guiding legal principle. As an illustration, what factors would counsel
against a delay of 90 days, said by the court to be potentially unreasonable
"in other circumstances"? If, as the court suggests, "it is impossible to
draw a line that categorically separates mandatory delay periods which
have a basis in reason, from those that so manifestly burden or impede the
election process that they can be characterized as intended to entrench the
incumbent board," then how can this ambiguity do other than encourage
clients "continually to push the time-delay envelope outwards"?" Thus, the
15 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998).
16 Id. at 41-42.
17 Id. at 43 n.70.
18 Id. This formulation can be read to require business judgment-like protection to
the directors' choice of a delay period. But since the bylaw is plainly intended to
slow down a hostile offer, the standard should rise to intermediate review. Indeed,
2001]
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absence of an explanation for the Delaware Supreme Court's preference for
elections over markets as a mechanism to mediate transfers of control invites a
repetition of the pattern by which limits on defensive conduct degraded under
unremitting client pressure.' 9 Shifting hostile tender offers into an election
context similarly invites a degrading of elections.
II. NORMATIVE PRINCIPLES FOR ASSESSING THE COMPARATIVE
DESIRABILITY OF MARKETS AND ELECTIONS AS MECHANISMS
FOR TRANSFERRING CORPORATE CONTROL
We ask whether, as a general rule, it is preferable for shareholders to decide
whether to sell the corporation through the mechanism of a tender offer
("transfer by sale") or through the mechanism of a fair election ("transfer
by vote")-a proxy contest free from managerial influence in which the
issue involves replacing the target board with the bidder's candidates, who
will be more inclined to sell. The normative criterion we use to answer
this question is efficiency, defined in this way: a transfer is efficient if a
target's assets will have a higher net expected value when managed by the
acquirer than by the target. Thus, for example, transfer by vote would be
more efficient than transfer by sale if assets were to move more frequently
to higher-valued users when approval is effected through a vote or if a
value-increasing transaction would be approved by either method, but an
election would involve lower transaction costs.
This definition of efficiency excludes the preferences of other
constituencies or stakeholders who may be affected by a transaction. We
exclude these preferences for two reasons. First, the Delaware Supreme
Court held in connection with the sale of the company that a board may
take into account the interests of other constituencies "provided there
are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders."20 The legal
touchstone therefore is shareholder value; directors cannot reject a valuable
transaction just because it would impose costs on third parties. Second, these
third parties can attempt to implement their preferences in both tender offer
because the bylaw restricts access to the election process, the standard of review
plausibly should rise further to a Blasius level.
19 Id. The downward spiral concerning defensive tactics is traced in Ronald Gilson &
Reiner Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is there
Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. L. 247 (1989).
20 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
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and proxy contexts. There now is no well-developed reason to believe that
either of these vehicles would be more receptive to the concerns of the affected
third parties than the other. Then, applying the law of least reason, we assume
that the two vehicles are equally open to third-party influence and we focus
on monetary values.
The efficiency criterion used here implies that advocates of transfer by
voting should be assigned the burden of proof in evaluating competing
transfer mechanisms for three reasons. First, it apparently is cheaper to run
a tender offer. In the current institutional environment, a potential acquirer
is compelled to win a proxy contest in order to make a tender offer. The
successful bidder thus must finance two procedures: the proxy contest and
then the acquisition. This typically will be more costly than transferring
control through a sale alone.2' Second, a tender offer seemingly operates more
quickly than a proxy contest.22 Third, as Part I argued, target managers have
both an incentive and the opportunity to pervert an election process. Sales are
harder to subvert. Taken together, these three reasons imply that transfer by
sale is preferable to transfer by vote unless transfer by vote results in assets
moving to higher-valuing users sufficiently more frequently to offset the
higher transaction and process costs associated with elections.
The comparative efficiency of transfer by sale and transfer by vote
ultimately is an empirical matter. Theory, we argue below, implies that
the burden of proof currently is not met: transfer by vote appears, if
anything, to be a less efficient mode than transfer by sale. In addition, the
empirical evidence shows that when the issue in the proxy contest is an
21 Bebchuk & Hart, supra note 2, assume that tender offers are more expensive
than proxy contests because a bidder must get financing to acquire a controlling
block, while a proxy fight just involves a change in the board "without a massive
rearrangement of ownership." In their model, however, there are no legal barriers to
making a takeover bid, so a "rival" can freely compete with the target's management
to manage the target's assets. The rival prevails either by making a successful tender
offer or by winning the proxy contest. Thus, Bebchuk and Hart contemplate one
procedure rather than two. We also are concerned that focusing on one procedure
in the way they do may be inappropriate because different control mechanisms
respond to different problems within the target corporation. See Andre Shliefer &
Robert Vishney, Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control, 79 Am. Econ. Rev.
842 (1989).
22 Our assumptions about cost and delay are plausible but not beyond question. If less
extensive defensive tactics are allowed in response to a proxy contest, then a tender
offer may be more expensive. Similarly, a tender offer may be slower if a target
can delay redeeming a poison pill in order to find a more valuable alternative, but
the potential acquirer can undertake an immediate consent solicitation to replace the
target board of directors.
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acquisition, contests that succeed increase target firm value, while contests
that fail reduce it.23 With the theoretical and empirical record in this state, we
will conclude that the Delaware Supreme Court is taking development of its
Unocal doctrine in the wrong direction. Preclusion of a tender offer alone
should be sufficient to fail Unocal's intermediate standard; the availability
of a transfer by vote, let alone one where target management can impede
that vote so long as an acquirer's success is not rendered "mathematically
impossible" or "realistically unattainable," is an inferior substitute.
III. TRANSFER OF CONTROL BY VOTE:
THE FULL INFORMATION CASE
A. The Model
We begin by assuming that a proxy contest to elect directors who will allow
a tender offer to proceed by removing a poison pill illustrates informed
voting: target shareholders, that is, are able to make an informed choice
in the proxy contest because they can evaluate the economic variables
bearing on the desirability of the underlying tender offer. This assumption
has some plausibility. Most of what the shareholders need to know is
incorporated in the price offered by the bidder. For convenience (and without
loss of descriptive accuracy), we will refer to shareholders confronting
such a proxy fight as voting for or against the acquisition. Under our
assumptions, 24 we first argue that with positive probability, the election will
reflect the preferences of the minority when minority voters have the greater
intensity of preference. We then argue that a minority composed of target
management and its associates may have sufficient intensity of preference
to defeat an efficient takeover because the manager group likely will have a
large, private stake in the outcome.25
23 See J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Proxy Contests and Corporate
Change: Implications for Shareholder Wealth, 47 J. Fin. Econ. 279 (1998).
24 We also assume throughout that there are many voters-again, a descriptively
accurate assumption in connection with corporate control contests-and, for
simplicity, that each shareholder has one vote (i.e., owns one share). The one-
share-one-vote assumption will turn out not to be innocuous in the imperfect
information case analyzed in infra Part IV.
25 An acquirer also may be interested in private benefits, in which event the proxy
contest may involve the spoils of control. We assume that this is not the typical
case for two reasons. First, the context in our model is the attempt to conclude an
acquisition. A successful acquirer will own much of the target and therefore will
792 [Vol. 2:783
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A shareholder in the transfer by vote game we consider2 6 understands that
she is voting for the insurgents and thus for the acquisition (outcome A) or for
the incumbents and thus for no acquisition (outcome N). The insurgents win
if a majority of votes are cast for A (ties are resolved randomly so that each
outcome wins a tie with probability .5). Let c be the cost of voting, which is
defined to include evaluating alternatives, developing a strategy, and casting
a ballot.27 A shareholder gets a payoff 0 from the result of the proxy contest
internalize much of the agency cost associated with management status. In this vein,
a recent paper argues: "A controlling party with a larger stake internalizes more of
the inefficiency of extracting private benefits, and thus extracts fewer of these gains.
Hence, the means of transferring control is important: Firm value is higher following
a tender offer than after a negotiated block trade." Mike Burkart, Denis Gromb &
Fausto Panunzi, Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate
Control, 55 J. Fin. 647, 649 (2000). Consequently, it is plausible to assume that
while decision-makers for the target often wish to protect private benefits, the
typical acquirer wants to maximize expected profits. Second, the political economy
of the issue suggests that managers of potential targets are protecting more than
shareholder value. Our analysis is symmetric as a formal matter, however. That is,
if the acquiring group has more private benefits at stake, they could win an election
that our efficiency criterion directs should be lost. For the reasons in this note, we
focus on the opposite possibility. Private benefits play a larger role in the Bebchuk
& Hart and Yilmaz analyses, but in their models, a rival competes to manage a
company through a proxy contest alone; such a rival may end up owning a small
enough share of the target to make realizing private benefits a plausible motive for
playing the game.
26 The analysis follows Colin M. Campbell, Large Electorates and Decisive Minorities,
107 J. Pol. Econ. 1199 (1999). For convenience, we assume that there is only one
potential acquirer. If this acquirer could make a bid directly to target shareholders,
would buy all tendered shares, and would freeze out dissenters if the bid succeeds,
then the target shareholders would not be in a strategic situation. For them, tendering
would be a weakly dominant strategy. This is another reason (see also supra note
4) for distinguishing the takeover context from the proxy context; in any Nash
equilibrium of the proxy contest game, we will see, target shareholders must play
strategically (a shareholder's action, that is, will partly be a function of the other
shareholders' actions).
27 Shareholders also incur costs in tender offers. We assume that the costs to a
shareholder of participating in a proxy context are higher than the costs of
participating in a tender offer for two reasons. First, there is more for the shareholder
to consider in a proxy contest. In a tender offer, the shareholder must only evaluate
the offer. Matters are more complex in a proxy contest because, under the law,
the winning slate cannot simply accept the bidder's offer; rather, the new board
must make an independent determination of what should be done next, the outcome
of which determination the shareholder must predict. See infra text at note 37.
Second, the shareholder may have to participate in two procedures-a vote and then
a possible tender offer-rather than one.
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that is a function of: (a) the monetary gain or loss that derives solely from
holding target stock; and (b) the positive or negative private benefit, if any,
that a target shareholder will experience as a result of the proxy contest's
outcome (which may depend on the impact of the outcome on the assets
or subjective utility of the shareholder, as with target managers, or on its
impact on the value of other shares in the stockholder's portfolio, as with
contemporaneous institutional holders of bidder stock).
We define a shareholder voter's utility from an election as
u(A, 0i) - u(N, 0i) = 0,
Here 0i is a voter's type, defined as her marginal payoff when the acquisition
wins rather than loses. Note that 0, will be negative if a voter prefers N to
A. A shareholder will have a strong preference for an outcome (0i will be
large for that voter) when her relative payoffs for the two outcomes differ
widely. This way of conceptualizing shareholder preferences implies that
some shareholders will not vote: for a nonvoting shareholder, the marginal
gain from her preferred outcome will be less than voting costs, even when
the shareholder's vote would be determinative.
An equilibrium of this voting game can be summarized by two numbers,
a and 3, that characterize the payoffs of those who vote. To be precise,
a is drawn from the set of negative payoffs that would result from the
acquisition sufficiently large as to exceed voting costs for a shareholder
who would get a payoff in that set. Hence, an a-shareholder would vote
against the acquisition if the likelihood were sufficiently great that her vote
would matter. Similarly, P is drawn from the set of positive payoffs that
would result from the acquisition sufficiently large as to exceed voting costs
for a shareholder who would get a payoff in that set. Shareholders whose
payoffs are not at least as great as those in a or 3 abstain. Hence, the
strategy profile in this election game-the rule the players follow-requires
all 0-types that are less than a to vote against the acquisition (i.e., vote
for target management) in the proper circumstances and all a-types that are
greater than 03 to vote for the acquisition (i.e., support the insurgent slate).
B. Results
A minority of voters could prevail in an election defined in this manner,
and the outcome of such a vote could be inefficient. The argument for these
conclusions is in two steps.28 First, the alternative whose marginal voter has a
greater stake in the outcome is likely to win the election. Second, the marginal
28 The results and intuition are set forth, not the proofs.
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voter with the greater stake will be in the minority if the probability that a
minority voter is more zealous (as we will define the term) is higher than the
probability that a majority voter is more zealous.
Regarding step one, realize that N (A) is more likely to win (lose) if the
probability that a voter prefers N is greater than the probability that a voter
prefers A.29 In any equilibrium, let a* and f3* be the equilibrium marginal
voters, namely, those whose payoffs are just negative or positive enough
to cause them to vote. If the number of votes for N is likely to exceed
the number of votes for A, then a shareholder who is considering voting
for A has a greater incentive to vote than someone with an equally strong
preference for N. This is because it is more likely that A will get one fewer
vote than N. Therefore, the A-voter does not need as large a stake in the
outcome as the N-voter (with preferences measured by 0) to participate:
the A-shareholder's vote is more likely to be needed. As a consequence,
the marginal shareholder voter is more likely to prefer N to A if and only
if the marginal N-voter would have a higher negative payoff from A than
the marginal A-voter would have a positive payoff (i.e., I a* I> Pi). This
condition implies that, F(x) > (1 - F(B)), which is to say that the alternative
whose marginal voter has a greater stake in the outcome is more likely to
win.
Regarding the second step, let t be the proportion of voters who prefer
N. Then, regardless of how small it is, N could be the winning outcome if
N-voters are more zealous than A-voters are. To see what is meant by zealous,
let there be a number x(it) such that only shareholders of type 0 > x(it) will
vote and such that 0 > x(it) together with the appropriate distributions among
those who prefer N and A, imply that itF(-O) > (1 - it)(1 - F2(0)), where F,
is the distribution of types among shareholders who prefer N and where F2 is
the distribution of types among. shareholders who prefer A. This condition
states that regardless of how many shareholders prefer A, there is a threshold
stake in the outcome such that the probability that a voter prefers N and
has a stake in excess of the threshold is greater than the probability that a
voter prefers A and has a stake that exceeds the threshold-that is, there
are more zealous N-voters than zealous A-voters.30 The first step, together
29 Mathematically (recalling that the marginal payoff to a voter who prefers N is
defined to be negative and the marginal payoff to a voter who prefers A is defined
to be positive), the requirement is that F(ce) is greater than (less than) 1 - F(P).
30 This condition is implied, as an illustration, by the stronger conditions that there
are types preferring N who exist with positive probability and whose intensities are
unmatched by types preferring A; or, if the distributions of types are continuously
differentiable, that while the most extreme A- and N-voters have identical intensities
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with the satisfaction of this condition, implies that N wins in equilibrium with
probability greater than one-half when the number of voters gets large.
For a formal sketch of the logic, it can be established that when a
sufficiently large number of voters exists, no type 0 c{,x(l)}-the "mild"
A-preferrers--can vote in any equilibrium. This is because the likelihood
that an A-voter would be pivotal is so low that the expected value of her
vote would be less than the costs. Thus, in any equilibrium (a*, P*), it must
be that JP* > x(ic): those who vote for A have large stakes in the outcome.
When the condition stated in the paragraph above is satisfied, however, -oc*
> P3, which implies by the first step in the argument that F(oX*) > 1 - F(13*):
the probability that the marginal voter prefers N in equilibrium is greater
than the probability that the marginal voter prefers A. Hence, N is more
likely to win than A.
As for the intuition, realize first that under the majority voting rule
considered here, a shareholder's vote will not matter if, when there are n
total voters, n/2 + 1 will vote for N or n/2 - 2 will vote for N: in either case,
the illustrative shareholder's vote cannot affect the outcome. Hence, the
shareholder, in deciding what to do, will ignore these cases and concentrate
on the possible states of the world in which her vote counts-when she is
the pivotal voter. These states occur either when there is an exactly even
number of votes for N and A or when N will get one less vote than A.
The zealous shareholders are those with the most at stake, and we now
assume that the key condition is satisfied: more zealous shareholders prefer
N to A. It follows that when the number of shareholders becomes large,
the likelihood that the vote of a shareholder who prefers A will be pivotal
becomes extremely small at the margin: there will be too few A-voters (as
opposed to A-preferrers) for this to happen with a substantial probability.
An A-preferring shareholder who perceives the probabilities correctly thus
herself will not vote unless her payoff from an acquisition is large. In sum,
as the threshold stakes increase, only voters with large stakes will be voting
and the alternative preferred by more of these zealous voters will have the
advantage.
Before applying this result directly to proxy contests in connection with
acquisitions, there are two general points to make. First, the voting game will
lead to an efficient outcome even when the minority wins if the intensity
of preference of the minority is sufficiently greater than the intensity of
preference of the majority. This would mean here that it would be efficient
of preference, the probability that an A-voter would be at the extreme is less than
the probability that an N-voter would be at the extreme.
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for N to win if the sum of all shareholder types (their Os) is negative. Recall
that it is the expected proportion of voters who prefer N. The expected value
of the outcome for a voter who prefers N thus is -Ot, and the expected
value of the outcome for a voter who prefers A is 0(1 - t). If t is small, the
expected value of the outcome for the typical N-preferrer can be lower than
the expected value of the outcome for the A-preferrer.31 When the electorate
is large and t is small, the probability thus is very low that the sum of all
voters'Os is negative. Therefore, when a large majority prefers an outcome
but the minority has more zealous voters and defeats the outcome for this
reason, the result often will be inefficient.
Second, this welfare analysis assumes that the preferences and costs
of voting are linked. To see why this matters, assume that preferences
and participation costs are drawn from different distributions. This implies
that as the relevant voter population becomes large, only persons with low
voting costs will participate. Given the assumption that costs and preferences
are independent, the preferences of these voters will be representative of
the preferences of the population at large.32 Hence, the election outcome will
implement the preferences of a majority of voters, though only a minority vote.
Just when preferences and voting costs are linked rather than independent in
real elections is an empirical question, but we will argue below that this link
exists for proxy contests in connection with takeovers.
C. An Application to Acquisitions
This model permits a zealous shareholder group to block an efficient
acquisition or to compel an inefficient one. We focus on the former problem
because, for the reasons given above (acquiring companies internalize
agency costs; markets are semi-strong efficient), it seems the more typical
case. Turning to the analysis, partition shareholders into two groups. The
first group, called "management shareholders," is composed of members
of current management and individuals and entities who would do better
if the takeover were defeated, such as unions and, perhaps, suppliers and
customers. These shareholders receive a private benefit from holding their
target shares under current target management. The second group is called
"independent shareholders" and is composed of those who benefit from their
shares only as shareholders; they receive no private benefits. Our focus on
31 We can represent this outcome mathematically as rE[-010 < 0] < (I- n)E[-o0 > 0].
32 See John 0. Ledyard, The Pure Theory of Large Two-Candidate Elections, 44 Pub.
Choice 7 (1984).
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the prevention of efficient acquisitions thus implies that a potential acquirer
votes its shares as though it were an independent shareholder.
Because of private benefits, the marginal management shareholder often will
have a higher payoff from defeating a takeover than the marginal independent
shareholder will have from the takeover being approved and the management
shareholder often will have lower voting costs. To understand these claims,
suppose initially that if the bidder's nominees win the proxy contest, the
company will be sold for at least p. Let a shareholder's opportunity cost in
selling a share now be x and the loss of private benefits to a management
group shareholder if A wins be b per share. An independent shareholder will
vote for A if the gain from sale, gs, equal to price less opportunity cost, is
greater than 0, or gs = p - x > 0. The management group shareholder will vote
for A if the gain to her from sale, gm, equal to price less opportunity cost less
private benefits, is greater than 0, or gn = p - x - b > 0. If gm < 0, then b > p -x.
As a result, the management group shareholder would have a higher negative
payoff than the independent shareholder would have a positive payoff when
b - (p - x) > p - x, or when b > 2(p -x).
Intuitively, the management group shareholder's loss per share in private
benefits is partly offset by the gain from tendering her stock. Thus, this
shareholder's negative payoff from an acquisition's success will exceed the
independent shareholder's positive payoff only if the private benefits loss is
large-formally, more than twice the financial gain on the sale of a share.
This condition will be satisfied when the management group holds relatively
few shares and would incur a large private benefit loss. In this circumstance,
the marginal management voter will be more zealous than the marginal
independent voter. And as shown above, when the probability that a voter
prefers N is low (there are relatively few management shares) but such a voter
has much at stake, an N-outcome--defeating the insurgent slate and thereby
blocking the tender offer-likely would have poor welfare properties.33
33 This analysis is complicated when we add a third category of voters: institutional
investors who, because of their portfolios (holding both the bidder and the target) or
because of their reputations, also have private benefits associated with the outcome
of the proxy contest. Because the private benefits of this group can depend on either
the takeover going forward because it increases the group's reputation as portfolio
managers or on it failing because the takeover reduces the value of the bidder by
more than the premium paid to the target, their position is not as predictable as
the management group shareholders. Thus, institutional investors may serve as a
partial offset to either the zealous management shareholder who votes against the
insurgents or to zealous bidder related target shareholders who ignore the impact of
the transaction on the value of the bidder's shares.
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Turning to costs, a management group shareholder commonly also will
have lower voting costs than an independent shareholder because preferences
and voting costs in proxy contests are not independent. The private benefits
that the management group seeks to preserve result from its status, which
also gives it lower cost access to the means to evaluate alternatives and
form a strategy than will be available to independent shareholders. 34 Hence,
a shareholder voter's preferences and costs are not drawn from independent
distributions.
The analysis to this point favors control changes through a market
mechanism rather than an electoral mechanism.35 Where some target voters
have a greater intensity of preference than acquirer voters and voting is
costly, a proxy contest can fail even if a majority of the electorate wanted
the challenge to succeed and if the sale that would have followed the vote
would have been efficient. The evidence is consistent with this conclusion.
In Mulherin and Poulsen's study of proxy contests involving acquisitions,
the 63 firms that were acquired had a cumulative average return of 12.4% in
the year following the contest, while the 53 firms that were not acquired had
a cumulative average return of minus 23.4%. If successful acquirers do not
lose money on average, this evidence suggests that partisan target managers
are defeating proxy challenges more frequently than efficiency argues they
should.36
34 Institutional shareholders provide an intermediate case with respect to costs, with
their status also reducing their voting costs because they possess expertise in
evaluating acquisitions generally and also because they know their own portfolios.
35 Our conclusion may partly be affected by the presence of arbitragers. These players
may have private benefits (perhaps the greater gains possible from a highly leveraged
portfolio) that balance those of the management group, they are likely to have lower
costs of voting than the typical independent shareholder, and they are therefore more
likely to vote than the independent shareholders from whom they bought the shares.
The role that arbitragers play in a voting model such as ours is not fully understood,
but we note that if arbitragers in fact are more likely to vote, then target managers
will be less likely to prevail (because arbitragers commonly want bids to succeed).
Then, if markets are semi-strong efficient and acquirers maximize expected profits,
arbitragers will push proxy contests toward efficiency.
36 This study uses aggregate rather than firm-level data. We speculate that inefficiency
is more likely to occur when institutional investors, especially professional
managers, hold a relatively small number of shares and where voting costs (which,
recall, include evaluation costs) are relatively high. This describes smaller public
corporations that have fewer institutional holders and a small analyst following.
Many of the recently public dot.coms are good examples.
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IV. VOTING UNDER UNCERTAINTY
The model above assumed: (i) each target shareholder owned one share
and thus had one vote; (ii) the number of voters was large; (iii) voting
was costly; (iv) for some voters, private benefits were at stake in the proxy
election; (v) shareholders knew the distribution from which shareholder
preferences were drawn (which permitted them to calculate the probability
that they were pivotal); and (vi) shareholder voters were fully informed
about the relevant variables. In this Part, we initially drop assumptions (iii)
and (iv), for convenience, and (vi), for possible realism. Regarding (vi),
uncertainty could exist respecting a proxy contest because the new board
has a fiduciary duty to represent all of the shareholders, not just the acquirer
that financed the contest.37 The new board thus could decide, after making the
requisite independent determination, not to sell the target, because it would
be more valuable under their management than under the old board, to sell the
target to someone other than the initial acquirer or to use a sale mode-a silent
auction, say-that encourages entry by other bidders. As a consequence, there
can be more uncertainty in connection with a proxy contest than with a tender
offer, where an affirmative action helps to produce a determinate payoff-the
shareholder gets the bid price if the offer succeeds.
We initially show that on the assumptions we now make, a proxy
election will aggregate information efficiently. This means that the election
will choose the outcome that would have been chosen had all private
information been revealed to all of the voters before the vote occurred.
Informational efficiency occurs because voters in large elections can invert
back solely from possible voting results to the payoff relevant variables.
The assumptions that each voter, holds one share and that no voter receives
private benefits are unrealistic, however. When they are relaxed, we will
see, shareholder voters no longer will know the distribution from which
shareholder preferences are drawn or the number of shareholders who have
observed particular signals of the true state of the world. And when the
37 The Delaware Supreme Court has noted that after such an election, the bidder's
"newly elected directors will be required to discharge their unremitting loyalty to
manage the corporation for the benefit of Quickturn and its stockholders." Thus, the
new directors would have to make an informed judgment, presumably subject to
review under Revlon's intermediate standard (Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)) if the transaction otherwise meets the
change in control test, that the proposed transaction represents the best alternative
available to the company. See AMP Inc. v. Allied Signal, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18582 (E.D. Pa.).
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voters lack this knowledge, full informational equivalence is unlikely to
obtain: that is, shareholders will, with a nontrivial probability, fail to choose
the outcome that would have been chosen in a full information world.38
The analysis in this Part is technical. Readers who believe that an institution
that performs badly when the information structure is favorable is unlikely to
perform well when the informational structure is unfavorable can go directly
to Part V, which sketches the policy implications of the analysis.
A. The Model
To pursue the implications of uncertainty, we again assume that the election
requires shareholder voters to choose between the outcomes A or N.
A shareholder's utility depends on his preferences over these outcomes
(shareholder preferences can differ) and on the true state of the world (in
some states of the world, an acquisition is best for a shareholder given his
preferences; in others, the target remaining independent is best). Utility is
indexed as before by 0; states of the world are indexed by s s [0, 1] (s lies
between 0 and 1). Similar to the above, we can write
v(s, 0) = u(A,s,0) - u(N,s,0)
which is the utility difference of a voter of type 0 between alternative A and
alternative N in state s. It is assumed that this difference is continuous and
is strictly increasing in 0 (higher types prefer A more) and in s ("higher"
states of the world are more favorable for A). Each shareholder knows his
own type but not the types of other shareholders.
Regarding timing, the game begins when the potential acquirer and target
management distribute proxy proposals. At this stage, each shareholder
has a prior probability over possible future states. The shareholder next
receives a signal a that correlates with the true state. These signals have a
38 What follows is drawn primarily from Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang Pessendorfer,
Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections with Private Information,
65 Econometrica 1029 (1997). Also helpful are Timothy Feddersen & Wolfgang
Pessendorfer, Convicting the Innocent: The Inferiority of Unanimous Jury Verdicts
under Strategic Voting, 92 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 23 (1998); Peter J. Coughlan, In
Defense of Unanimous Jury Verdicts: Mistrials, Communication, and Strategic
Voting, 94 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 375 (2000); David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks,
Information Aggregation, Rationality and the Condorcet Jury Theorem, 90 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 34 (1996). Some experimental confirmation of this genre of model
is found in Serena Guarnaschelli, Richard D. McKelvey & Thomas R. Palfrey, An
Experimental Study of Jury Decision Rules, 94 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 407 (2000). All
of these papers are complex mathematically. The text above attempts to present the
intuition.
20011
Theoretical Inquiries in Law
public element (e.g., the information in proxy proposals and the acquirer
and target's public communications) and a private element (e.g., what a
particular shareholder learns about the relevant business environment). The
private element of the signal that shareholder i receives is independent of
the private element of the signal that shareholder j receives. A shareholder's
strategy in this game has two elements: to vote for A or to vote for N; and to
use the information in his signal when voting or to discard this information.
Shareholders vote after choosing a strategy and receiving signals.
We let A win if (n + 1)q voters choose A, where 0 < q < 1 and q is fixed
in advance.39 Preferences thus would be aggregated under majority rule if
q = Y2, but the analysis permits super- or sub-majority voting rules as well.
A shareholder voter can influence the outcome only when nq voters will
vote for A, and he will then, conditional on his vote being pivotal, choose
A if that has the higher expected payoff. In any equilibrium of this voting
game, some voters will ignore their signals to vote for A (N). These voters
have sufficiently strong priors over what they think the true state is or have
sufficiently strong preferences for one of the outcomes, so that the expected
value to these voters of an A (N) vote, conditional on being pivotal, cannot
be changed by the signal they receive. As a consequence, only a subset of
voters can vote informatively (vote on the basis of their signals).4°
B. Full Informational Equivalence
Full informational equivalence occurs, on the assumptions above, because
voters in large elections can infer what the true state of the world is by
"inverting back" to that state from the distribution of voter preferences and
the voting rule. To begin to see how, it is helpful to start with two definitions:
(a) The probability that a randomly selected voter -votes for N in state s is
t(s,A), where A is the equilibrium strategy profile. (b) The probability that
a voter would observe the signal a when the true state of the world is s is
p(a I s). When the electorate is large, voter beliefs about t(s,A), conditional
on the voter being pivotal, will be concentrated around q, the portion of
votes required for N to prevail. A voter will be pivotal when nq other voters
would vote for N. Since the voter's preferences partly are a function of the
true state of the world, the voter will attempt to infer that state; and he will
39 In large elections, the probability of a tie is very small, so the analysis from now
on omits a rule to resolve ties. Note also that since voting here is assumed to be
costless, all shareholders inthe model will vote.
40 Voting on the basis of one's signal is called informative because when voters act in
this way, one can infer a voter's private information from his vote.
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do this by asking what signals regarding the true state of the world must the
other shareholders have observed in order for the illustrative shareholder
to be pivotal. Suppose that many voters were observing signals such that
for those voters, p(aIls) > q. Since t(sA) must lie between 0 and 1 and
since a voter's preferences are non-increasing in s, that so many voters were
observing signals that s likely is "high" is inconsistent with the fact that nq
voters are voting for N; for when s is that high, the randomly selected voter
is likely to choose A with probability greater than q. Conversely, that many
shareholders were observing signals such that for them p(ai s) < q would be
inconsistent with the fact that as many as nq shareholders were voting for A;
for when the probability that the state is low is large, the randomly selected
voter will choose N with probability greater than q. It must follow that if nq
voters would vote for N, the illustrative voter will think that the probability
that a randomly selected voter will vote for N in state s-t(s,A)-must lie
in the close, neighborhood of q. And this in turn implies that the voter will
infer that the likely true states of the world are those that would cause a
randomly selected voter to prefer N with probability q."
As a consequence of voters putting most of their probability mass on a very
few possible states, the "information generating service"-the available facts
and permissible inferences from them-is unlikely to permit the shareholder
to make fine distinctions among these states. Formally, let there be a subset
of possible states denoted S with the property that, conditional on a vote
being pivotal, the true state s is in S with probability 1; and the probability
that the voter will receive a certain signal a given that the true state is s will
be constant on the set S for all signals a. When the signals are uninformative,
the expected payoff difference in voting for A or N, conditional on one's
vote being pivotal, will be independent of the signal a voter receives. And
when the payoff difference is independent of the signal, the portion of
shareholders who vote for A on the basis of their prior probability estimates
and preferences alone and the portion of shareholders who vote for N on
the basis of their prior probability estimates and preferences alone approach
each other. That is, almost no voter votes on the basis of the signal he
receives-votes informatively-when the electorate is large.
Strategic voting nevertheless will achieve full informational equivalence.
41 As an illustration, suppose that n = 1000 and q = Y2. A voter who is pivotal knows
that 500 voters will choose N. That this many voters prefer N is inconsistent with
many more than half the voters observing signals implying that A or N would be
best. The illustrative voter thus will think that the true states of the world are those
generating signals that would induce a randomly selected voter to prefer N with
probability approximating Y, which is q.
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This is because if the signal generating service is accurate, 42 then a
shareholder can predict the actual state with great accuracy, conditional on
his vote being pivotal. To begin to see why these predictions are possible,
the discussion to here is the basis for a showing that the distribution over
states in S, conditional on a vote being pivotal, converges on a particular state,
which can be denoted s". Convergence occurs because when the maximum
difference between any pair of states in S is small-which it is-then for
a large enough electorate, the probability distribution over states must be
arbitrarily concentrated around one state. Consequently, the voters will line
up such that if q = Y2, then because the electorate thinks that sn is the true
state, conditional on the median-that is, pivotal-voter determining the
outcome, very close to 50% will vote against A (for them, A is bad in
state sn) and very close to 50% will vote for N. Because voters will line up
in this way in large elections, the concentration of shareholder beliefs on
the single state sn implies that large elections will be close with probability
approaching one in every state. Put another way, the fraction of the electorate
that supports N will be very close to the critical fraction q.
Turning to informational equivalence, let 0* be the expected preference
parameter of the median voter. We have just seen that in a large election,
the actual preference parameter of the median voter, called the "q- median,"
will be close to 0*; and in a large election, the actual q-median's preferred
alternative wins. Therefore, full informational equivalence is achieved if the
expected preference parameter 0* wins with probability close to 1.
To see why it will, realize that the alternative preferred by the expected
q-median voter depends on the state. Let s* be the state in S that minimizes
v(0*,s). 43 When v(0*,s*) = 0, the expected q-median voter is indifferent to
the outcome. If v(0*,s*) > 0, there is no state in which a voter of type 0*
prefers N to A, and hence s* is the state in which A should prevail. Similarly,
if v(0*,s*) < 0, then s* is the state in which N should prevail. Therefore,
there will be full informational equivalence if A is almost certainly the
winner when the actual state s > s*, and N wins otherwise.
Now consider a state in which v(0*,s*) = 0, so the q-median voter is
indifferent to the outcome. Recall that, conditional on a vote being pivotal,
the distribution over states puts almost all of the weight on one state, s", so
42 To be precise, the assumption is that the monotone likelihood ratio property holds:
roughly, a voter is more likely to observe a signal that the state s is high rather than
low when the true state is high.
43 Recall that v(6,s) is the utility difference between A winning and N winning for a
voter of type 0 in state s. Hence, the smaller v(0,s)), the closer to indifference the
voter.
[Vol. 2:783
Sales and Elections as Methods
that voters behave as if state Sn has occurred. In the limit (when n becomes
large), sn = s*. To see why, realize that if v(O*, sn) > 6 > 0, the fraction of
voters who prefer N in state sn is smaller than and bounded away from q.
But then the fraction of voters who vote for N in s" also is smaller than and
bounded away from q, and this contradicts the result that large elections
are close-that actual vote shares are close to expected vote shares with
high probability. Further, an election can be close only if voters believe that
the state is very close to s* (in which state the q-median voter is close to
indifferent). Since the vote share of alternative N is defined to be strictly
decreasing in the state s, a tie could occur only if for a state s < s*-E, N wins
with probability close to 1 and for a state s > s*+E, A wins with probability
close to 1. This is the condition for full informational equivalence. Hence,
full informational equivalence obtains when and because voters can invert
back from the fact of being pivotal to what the true state likely is.'
To summarize the model's logic, shareholders do not vote on the basis
of the information in the signals they receive. In such cases, large elections
will be close, thus implying that the outcome will be decided by the votes
of those taking informative action. The pivotal voter can infer the true state
with great accuracy (under the model's assumptions). Hence, the election
will reach the outcome that would have been reached had every voter known
the information in all of the voters' signals.
C. The Failure of Full Informational Equivalence
A large election will satisfy full informational equivalence when voters
ignore their signals (that is, do not act on the basis of their private
information). It is rational for voters to behave in this way because a
strategic voter can infer the true state with great accuracy. The voter can
44 To get a flavor of the actual proof, let the probability that a voter is indifferent
between N and A be greater than q for the highest possible state s. All voters whose
preferences-their Os-are less than this indifference preference will vote for N. In
a large election, N will then be chosen with probability close to 1: more than q%
of the voters will prefer N. This result will satisfy full informational equivalence
because voters with preferences below the indifference preference in the highest
state would prefer N in every lower state. Similarly, A will win if the probability that
a voter is indifferent between N and A in the lowest possible state s is less than q.
(The proof is complex when F(ON) < q < F(O^).) In a different model, Yilmaz, supra
note 2, also shows that a proxy contest will aggregate information efficiently. As in
our analysis to this point, Yilmaz assumes that shareholders know the distribution
from which voter preferences are drawn and that no one in the relevant shareholder
universe owns a block.
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draw this inference, first, because each voter knows the distribution from
which voter preferences are drawn. Then, conditional on the voter being
pivotal, the voter also knows how many voters have observed signals that
favor one result or the other. A strategic shareholder can use these data to
invert back to the true state of the world from his status as the pivotal voter.
Full informational equivalence likely fails in proxy contest elections in
which a takeover is the ultimate issue, however, because shareholders lack
the data required to draw the key inference. Specifically, voters may not
know the distribution of shareholder preferences and seldom will know,
even conditional on being pivotal, how many voters have observed which
signals.
To see why uncertainty about the preference distribution defeats the
equivalence result just derived, let the distribution function according to
which nature selects the electorate depend on the parameter Y 4[0,1], and be
given by H(0). Because there now are partisans, this distribution has mass at
the values for 0 that imply partisanship: that is, there is a positive probability
that some voters will be partisans. For convenience, the likelihood that there
are many N-partisans is assumed to be falling in y, and conversely. The
number of partisans for either alternative is assumed to be less than the
fraction of the electorate needed to elect that alternative. In this version
of the election game, nature first chooses the state s and the parameter -
independently and voters have priors over both variables. The realized state
is (s,y), and after it is chosen, nature picks an electorate by drawing from Hv
(0). There will be an expected q-median voter given the realized y- Similar
to the above, s(y) is the state in which this voter is indifferent to the outcome:
(v(s(y), 0(y))=O. Full informational equivalence is defined as before, using
this concept of indifference.
Turning to information aggregation, suppose that for a particular state (s,
y) the expected vote share of alternative N is q (recall that large elections
are close). A shareholder, however, now no longer can infer the actual state
by reasoning that because he is pivotal, he must put most of his probability
weight on distributions of the state s in which the expected vote share of N
is q. This is because now the voter can be pivotal in more than one way.
Recall that the vote share for N is a strictly decreasing function of y (because
the expected number of N-partisans falls as y declines); and the vote share
for N also is a strictly decreasing function of the state s (for nonpartisans).
Consequently, the expected vote share for N would be unchanged if s is
decreased but y is increased. Conditional on being pivotal, a shareholder
voter thus will believe that one of the states exists in which the expected
vote share of N is q. But now there is an interval of states such that this
could occur, depending on the states and the number of partisans.
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Therefore, the voter no longer can use the chain of reasoning described
above, inferring back from vote counts to states of the world. Put
mathematically, the voters' beliefs over states cannot converge to a
degenerate distribution, which puts almost all of the weight on one state
(sn in the initial analysis). In this event, even conditional on being pivotal,
a voter's private information-his signal-will convey useful information
about what the actual state is; hence, the fraction of voters who vote on the
basis of their signals no longer goes to zero.
Full informational equivalence requires that for states in which the pivotal
voter is indifferent (v(s(y)), y), the expected vote share for N must be close
to q in a large election. When voters vote informatively, this condition is
not met. For a generic choice of the preference parameter v, equilibrium
strategies allow too few degrees of freedom to have the expected vote share
equal to q for all states ((s(y), y). The problem is as stated: There now are two
random variables, s and y, both of which are correlated with the votes for
each alternative. Thus, a voter no longer can reason back from his status as
being pivotal to the payoff relevant state variables. And given this inability,
then close to the set of indifference states-s(y),y--the wrong alternative is
chosen with high probability.
There will be uncertainty over the preference distribution in connection
with proxy votes for takeovers because the identity of the management
group often is uncertain. Shareholders who comprise the target's board are
highly likely to vote against. An important supplier also will vote for N if
there is no state of the world in which it would do better were the target
under new management, but the supplier could prefer A if there is a chance
that it would do better after a major change. The share prices of targets fall
when acquisitions are defeated unless another bidder likely is forthcoming.
Hence, arbitragers may or may not be partisan, depending on their view of
the corporate control market. Suppliers, customers, unions, and arbitragers,
that is, may or may not be partisans. This implies that for a nonpartisan
shareholder, the other shareholder votes will be a function both of the state
s and of the distribution of voter types-y in the analysis above-where
the voter knows H1(0) but not nature's particular draw. Therefore, in many
proxy contests, shareholders could not invert from voting positions to states
of the world.
A second reason for the inability of a shareholder voter to infer the
true state of the world in proxy elections is that the number of people who
observe signals about the true state is strictly smaller than the number of votes
(because shareholders can hold blocks). As a consequence, the expected vote
share for an alternative can equal the required voting percentage to pass that
alternative in more than one way. To understand why this matters, suppose
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that the expected vote share for N equals q. An individual shareholder and a
block shareholder both will consider only the state in which they are pivotal
in order to decide how to vote, but for each of them, the configuration
of voters requisite to their being pivotal will differ. As a simple example,
assume that X = 100 shares, q = Y, 5 shareholders hold blocks of 10, and 50
shareholders hold 1 share each. Then a nonpartisan individual shareholder
can be pivotal if: (i) the 5 ten-vote blocks prefer A but no individuals do; (ii)
4 ten-vote blocks and 10 individuals prefer A; (iii) 3 ten-vote blocks and 20
individuals prefer A; (iv) 2 ten-vote blocks and 30 individuals prefer A; and
(v) 1 ten-vote block and 40 individuals prefer A. A nonpartisan block holder
would be pivotal if there are 41 votes for A, which could occur if: (i) 3
other ten-vote blocks and 11 individual shareholders vote for A; (ii) 2 other
block shareholders prefer A and 21 individuals do; (iii) 1 other ten-vote
block prefers A and 31 individuals do; and (iv) 41 individuals prefer A. The
individual shareholder and the block holder thus would be attempting to
infer the true state conditional on the expected vote share being equal to Y2,
but they would be using different voter configurations to perform this task.
To appreciate the difficulty this example exposes, when every voter has
one vote, a voter can infer, conditional on being pivotal, the signals about the
true state of the world that other voters have observed. An essential step in
the argument for full informational equivalence, recall, is that voter beliefs
about which state exists concentrate around a very small set of states: those
that could produce a value for the probability that a random voter would
support N that approximates q. When the number of votes is decoupled from
the number of voters, such an inference from the fact of being pivotal to the
true state of the world no longer is possible to draw. In the example above,
an individual shareholder would be pivotal if 5, 14, 23, 32, or 41 other
shareholders were to observe certain signals. When as few as 5 or as many
as 41 voters have observed signals implying that the true state of the world
is such that N is the best choice, a shareholder voter lacks a reason, even
conditional on being pivotal, to put probability mass on a very few possible
future states. To use the notation above, there no longer exists a set of states
S in which voter signals will not distinguish among the states. Thus, proxy
contest voters will vote on the basis of the varying signals that they observe
(i.e., shareholders will vote informatively). This will lead to the failure of
full informational equivalence: a proxy contest is unlikely to reach the result
that would have been reached had all information been revealed before the
vote.45
45 In this model, randomly bad results can occur: uninformed target shareholders
sometimes will incorrectly say yes and sometimes incorrectly say no. Bebchuk
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D. Summary
The analyses of proxy voting in Parts III and IV assumed a relatively
ideal voting environment. The entire target board was up for election at
the same time, and target management did nothing to subvert the election
process. Voting performed badly nevertheless. When shareholder voters
were assumed to be well informed, Part III showed how a proxy challenge
could fail even if a majority of the electorate wanted the challenge to succeed
and the proposed merger would have been efficient. The forces driving that
model were the different intensities of preference of shareholder voters and
costly voting. The model in Part IV initially dropped the assumptions of
full information and costly voting and showed that in these circumstances,
a proxy election with a large number of voters would aggregate information
efficiently. When the assumptions that each shareholder has one vote and
no voters are partisan are relaxed, however, then there will be inefficient
information aggregation, even when voting is costless. The election could
choose A when N would be efficient (on the value maximization criterion
set out above) or could choose N when A would be efficient. While the two
models we use reflect different ways of analyzing the question this paper
addresses, it is significant that they agree on the same conclusion: transfer
by voting has a good chance of reaching the wrong result. Given that the
& Hart, supra note 2, argue that imperfect information systematically biases
proxy contests against the rival. To see how they reach this conclusion, follow
them and define the present value of the cash flow that would be realized under
the rival's management as YR and the present value of the cash flow under
incumbent management as Y. Then, YR-Y, = AYR, which is drawn from the density
function g(-IY,) with support of (-Y,, infinity) and mean AYR*(Y). Next make
two assumptions: (i) target shareholders know the distribution g('Y), but cannot
observe particular realizations of AYR; and (ii) uninformed shareholders assume that
the mean of the distribution AYR*(Y,) is negative. The second assumption holds
that rivals will lose money on average and is made because "[p]resumably there are
many bad managers in the world who would be more than happy to run a public
company and capture some private benefits of control." Id. When shareholders
believe that rivals will lose money, they will vote no regardless of the quality a rival
may possess, and the market price will not inform them: the market-maker, even if
herself informed, will set the price equal to P = Y, because the incumbent always
wins. The second assumption is inapplicable to our context because acquirer/rivals
are maximizing profits rather than private benefits (see supra note 25). Target
shareholders are unlikely to assume that well-financed bidders interested in making
money will lose money on average. Of significance, both the Bebchuk & Hart
analysis and our analysis conclude that proxy contests evaluate proposed changes
in corporate control poorly in imperfect information environments.
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burden of proof is appropriately assigned to the transfer by vote mechanism
(see supra Part II), this conclusion strongly suggests that the Delaware
Supreme Court's preference for elections is misplaced. Part V turns to an
analysis of how that preference would best be changed.
V. RETURNING TO DOCTRINE AND POLICY:
WHAT CAN BE DoNE?
Our formal inquiry into the relative efficiency of sale and voting as
mechanisms for control changes was motivated by a real problem. In
Unitrin, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a refusal to redeem a
poison pill in the face of a hostile tender offer was not preclusive and
therefore did not violate Unocal's intermediate standard when the offer's
only threat, other than to management strategy, was a too low price.
Although the poison pill prevented a tender offer, so long as the bidder's
prospects for dislodging a majority of the board through a proxy fight were
not "mathematically impossible or realistically unattainable,"46 the bidder
was relegated to pursuing the transaction through the electoral process. The
Unitrin holding thus permits a target to require that an election, rather
than the market, mediate a control contest. Moreover, if we are to take the
"mathematically impossible or realistically unattainable" language seriously,
target management remains free to raise significant barriers to a proxy
contest. Although target management cannot with certainty prevent a proxy
fight from succeeding and thereby eliminate any incentive to undertake one,
management can significantly reduce the likelihood of success. This is a
serious concern, especially because, as Parts III and IV have shown, proxy
contests can function poorly even when target management respects the
process. How, then, can the Delaware Supreme Court get out of the mess
it made in Unitrin, without having simply to announce it was wrong, a
strategy that QVC demonstrates is not attractive to them?47
While there is room for the Supreme Court to reevaluate its position in
46 651 A.2d 1361, 1388-89 (Del. 1995).
47 In Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1994), the Supreme Court rejected its own formulation of the Revlon trigger set
out in Time in favor of the change of control test formulated by the Chancery
Court in the same case. When confronted by counsel's claim that Paramount had
complied with the Supreme Court's Revlon standard, the Court responded by stating
that "[t]he Paramount defendants have misread the holding of Time-Warner. ... The
Paramount defendants' argument totally ignores the phrase 'without excluding other
[Vol. 2:783
Sales and Elections as Methods
light of doctrinal ambiguity in the Unitrin opinion,48 the more promising
approach reflects comic Mel Brook's advice when confronted with the need
to respond to someone else's embarrassing public behavior: "Be oblique."49
Central to Unitrin's favoring a control shift though an election rather than
the market is the capacity of a poison pill to preclude a tender offer and the
capacity of target management to adopt a pill without shareholder approval.
Delaware's sympathetic treatment of the pill in Household International5°
was understandably a product of the unique circumstances of the early
1980s-a wave of hostile takeovers that reasonable people honestly, if
incorrectly, believed threatened the economy and the inaction of other
institutions, which left the Delaware courts as the only policy maker that
had to confront the issue.5" Because shareholders could not be counted on to
approve a pill, adoption was left to management.
The crisis of the 1980s is past, and large institutional shareholders routinely
approve pills that are not preclusive. In this calmer time, shareholder adopted
bylaws provide the opportunity to shrink the influence of the pill and,
therefore, the effectiveness of the means through which the preference for
elections over markets operates. Equally important, given the Delaware
Supreme Court's sensitivity to acknowledging a mistake, this can be
accomplished without directly confronting the line of cases growing out
of Household International.
The issue of the validity of shareholder-adopted bylaws that repeal an
existing poison pill is now working its way through the Delaware courts.
Many thoughtful Delaware lawyers take the position that such bylaws
violate section 141(a)'s52 grant of managerial power to the board of directors,
especially after the Delaware Supreme Court in Mentor Graphics53 used that
possibilities."' Id. at 48. It would have been much more straightforward for the court
to have acknowledged that it had changed its mind.
48 Vice-Chancellor Strine recently commented with refreshing candor that,
Delaware's doctrinal approach [to defensive tactics] is premised on the
assumption that the world can be viewed clearly by simultaneously wearing three
pairs of eye glasses with different prescriptions (Unocal, business judgment, and
entire fairness). It is not apparent that this approach works any better in the law
than it does in the field of optics.
In re Gaylord Container Corp. Shareholders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 476 n.46 (Del.
Ch. 2000).
49 Mel Brooks & Carl Reiner, The Two Thousand and Thirteen Year Old Man (1960).
50 Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
51 Gilson, supra note 5.
52 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(2) (Supp. 1996).
53 Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quicktum Design Sys., 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch. 1998).
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argument to avoid confronting the validity of a dead hand or slow hand pill
under Unocal. However, section 141(a)'s grant of authority is qualified by
the phrase "except as otherwise permitted in this chapter or in the certificate
of incorporation." Section 109(b)-obviously "in this chapter"-authorizes
shareholders to adopt bylaws containing "any provision, not inconsistent
with law or with the certificate of incorporation, relating to the business of
the corporation, the conduct of its affairs, and the rights and powers of its
stockholders, directors, officers, or employees."
To the doctrinalist, section 141 (a)'s broad grant of authority to the directors
by referring to the "business and affairs of the corporation," juxtaposed with
section 109(b)'s equally broad grant of authority to shareholders to adopt
bylaws concerning "the business of the corporation [and] the conduct of
its affairs," makes relevant the Delaware doctrine of "equal dignity" or
"independent legal significance."' This doctrine, which invites corporate
planners to choose among statutory alternatives for dealing with precisely
the same functional activity, is the very embodiment of Delaware's enabling
approach to corporate law,
Allowing shareholders to redeem poison pills or replace them with less
expansive versions by means of a bylaw provides a means for Delaware
courts to retreat with dignity from the extreme position to which they
were driven by the turmoil of the 1980s. To be sure, section 109(b) was
not initially intended for this function, but Household International itself
provides the response. Responding to the same objection with respect to its
broad reading of section 157 the Supreme Court quoted Unocal:
Our corporate law is not static. It must grow and develop in response
to, indeed in anticipation of, evolving concepts and needs. Merely
because the General Corporation Law is silent as to a specific matter
does not mean that it is prohibited.55
While the shareholder bylaw route still leaves the balance between
shareholders and management tipped toward management-absent
Household International, it would be better to require the directors to
seek approval to impose a pill in the first instance rather than to require
the shareholders to seek repeal because of our rules for who bears the cost
54 See Jeffrey Gordon, "Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and
Shareholder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 Cardozo L. Rev.
511 (1997).
55 500 A.2d 1346, 1351 (Del. 1985) (citing 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985)).
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of proxy initiatives-it does allow shareholders to rebalance the preference
among mechanisms for the transfer of control.
This odd strategy has some of the characteristics of a Rube Goldberg
machine. The strategy reflects elements of doctrinal elegance in deploying
Delaware's strongly held but unpredictably applied penchant for formalism
reflected in both the equal dignity doctrine and Mentor Graphics, but it is less
than a complete fix. The need to operate through a shareholder-adopted bylaw
implicates the very electoral mechanism whose difficulties we have begun
to explore above. Also, the strategy hardly commends itself to corporate
governance systems considering the issue that lack Delaware's peculiar
history. Therefore, other countries that must choose between elections
and markets as mechanisms for the transfer of corporate control would
be well advised to deal with the issue directly in a statute rather than
obliquely. Because the case for elections seemingly cannot overcome a
sensibly grounded presumption in favor of markets, we now believe that
any statute should require pills to receive shareholder approval before
becoming operative.
The amended proposed European Union Thirteenth Directive on Company
Law Concerning Takeover Bids56 illustrates this more thoughtful approach.
Two elements of the proposed directive are relevant here. Article 3(c) states
the general principle: "[T]he board of an offeree company ... must not deny
the holders of securities the opportunity to decide on the merits of the
offer." Article 8 prevents this principle from being given a Unitrin-like spin,
according to which the holders may be forced to decide on the merits
of the offer through a proxy fight. Rather, under Article 8(a), the offeree
company "should abstain from completing any action other than seeking
alternative bids which may result in the frustration of the offer ... unless
it has the prior authorization of the general meeting of the shareholders
given for this purpose .... ." The brevity of this language would have
given European Member States significant flexibility in the framing of
implementing legislation and also would have given European takeover
lawyers the ambiguity out of which to draw courts into an important
role in the resolution of takeover contests. The animating principle of the
proposed Thirteenth Directive nonetheless was apparent, however: markets
are preferred to elections as mechanisms to mediate the transfer of corporate
control. Unfortunately, the proposed directive, the result of the conciliation
process between the European Parliament, the Commission, and the Council
56 Commission Proposal for a Thirteenth Directive on Company Law Concerning
Takeovers, 1990 O.J. (C 38) 41, 44.
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of Ministers, was rejected in early July of this year by an equally divided
European Parliament, with the virtually unanimous opposition of the German
delegation driving the result. The German change of heart was said to result
from the successful hostile takeover of Mannesmann by Vodaphone, a
British company.57 We are thus reminded that the object of our study is, in the
end, a matter not just of economics, but also of political economy.
57 Company Law: Parliament No Vote Shreds Takeover Directive, Eur. Rep., July 6,
2001; Business MEPS Miss Vote to Reform Company Law, Irish Indep., July 6,
2001.
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